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STATUTES REPRODUCED
Utah Code Ann, § 13-1-12 (Supp 1992).
(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, the
administrative law judge or an occupational board or
representative committee with cissistance from the administrative
law judge, shall issue an order.
(b) The order may be appealed to the executive director or
the division director for review.
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason to
fairly review or rule upon an order of the administrative law
judge or a board or committee, the executive director shall
review and rule upon the order.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2 (1990).
For purposes of this title:
(1) "Department" means the Department of Commerce.
(2) "Director" means the director of the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing.
(3) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing.
(4) "Executive director" means the executive director of
the Department of Commerce.
(5) "Licensee" includes any holder of a license,
certificate, permit, student card, or apprentice card authorized
under this title.
(6) "Unprofessional conduct" means acts, knowledge, and
practices which fail to conform with the accepted standards of
the specific licensed occupation or profession and which could
jeopardize the public health, safety, or welfare and includes
the violation of any statute regulating an occupation or
profession under this title.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-4 (Supp. 1992).
(1) The division shall be under the supervision, direction,
and control of a director. The director shall be appointed by
the executive director with the approval of the governor. The
director shall hold office at the pleasure of the governor.
(2) The director shall perform all duties, functions, and
responsibilities assigned to the division by law or rule and,
where provided, with the collaboration and assistance of the
boards established under this title.
v

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-6 (Supp. 1992).
The duties, functions, and responsibilities of the division
include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) prescribing, adopting, and enforcing rules to
administer this title;
(2) investigating the activities of any person governed by
the laws and rules administered and enforced by the division;
(3) subpoenaing witnesses, taking evidence, and requiring
by subpoena duces tecum the production of any books, papers,
documents, records, contracts, recordings, tapes,
correspondence, or information relevant to an investigation upon
a finding a sufficient need by the director;
(4) taking administrative and judicial action against
persons in violation of the laws and rules administered and
enforced by the division, including, but not limited to, the
issuance of cease and desist orders;
(5) seeking injunctions and temporary restraining orders
to restrain unauthorized activity;
(6) giving public notice of board meetings;
(7) keeping records of board meetings, proceedings, and
actions and making those records available for public inspection
upon request;
(8) issuing, refusing to issue, revoking, suspending,
renewing, refusing to renew, or otherwise acting upon any
license or licensee;
(9) preparing and submitting to the governor and the
Legislature an annual report of the division's operations,
activities, and goals;
(10) preparing and submitting to the executive director of
the department a budget of the expenses for the division;
(11) establishing the time and place for the
administration of examinations; and
(12) preparing lists of licensees and making these lists
available to the public at cost upon request unless otherwise
prohibited by state or federal law,
Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-8.5 (1990).
All boards created under the authority of this chapter shall
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in their adjudicative proceedings.
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-15 (Supp. 1992).
The division may refuse to issue or renew, and may suspend,
revoke, or place on probation the license of any licensee who:
(1) is or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct, as
defined by statute or rule;
(2) has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude which, when considered with the functions and duties
of the occupation or profession for which the license was
issued, demonstrates a threat to the public health, safety, and
welfare;
(3) has obtained or attempted to obtain a license by
misrepresentation; or
(4) fails to pay the renewal fee or secure a renewal of
the license within the time fixed by statute or rule.
Section § 58-1-16 (Supp. 1992)
(1) (a) Before suspending, revoking, placing on
probationer refusing to renew a license, and before
issuing a cease and desist order, the division shall
comply with the procedures and requirements of Title
63, Chapter 4 6b, Administrative Procedures Act;
however, before proceeding under the provisions of
Section 63-46b-20, providing for emergency adjudicative
proceedings, the division shall review the proposed
action with a committee of licensees appointed by the
licensing board established under this title for the
profession of the person against whom the action is
proposed.
(b) By complying with the procedures and requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the director may hold or
cause to be held administrative hearings regarding any
other matter affecting the division or the activities
of any person authorized to practice his occupation or
profession under this title.
(2) (a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held
before enn appropriate presiding officer, as designated
by the director, (b) The presiding officer shall make
written recommendations for action, findings of fact,
and conclusions of law.
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on
the recommendations but is not bound to follow the
recommendations of the presiding officer.
vn

(d) If the director does not issue an order within ten
days after the presiding officer has made the
recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding
officer shall become the order.
(3) (a) The director or his designee may administer
oaths, issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of papers, books,
accounts, documents, and evidence,
(b) Any party to any action permitted under this
section may issue subpoenas and compel the attendance
of witnesses and the production of papers, books,
accounts, documents, and evidence.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-9 (Supp. 1992).
The division, in collaboration with the board, may refuse to
issue or renew, or may suspend, revoke, or restrict the license
of any person, upon one or more of the following grounds:
(1) any condition that prevents a pharmacist or licensed
intern from engaging in the practice of pharmacy with reasonable
skill, competence, and safety to the public;
(2) being found guilty by a court of competent
jurisdiction of one or more of the following:
(a) a felony;
(b) any act involving moral turpitude or gross
immorality;
(c) violations of the pharmacy, drug, alcohol, and
chemical dependencies laws of this state or rules pertaining to
them, or of statutes, rules, or regulations of any other state
in which the licensee engages in the practice of pharmacy, or of
the federal government;
(3) fraud or intentional misrepresentation by any licensee
in securing the issuance or renewal of a license;
(4) engaging or aiding and abetting an individual to
engage in the practice of pharmacy without a license, or falsely
using the title of pharmacist;
(5) being found by the board to be in violation of this
chapter or rules adopted under this chapter;
(6) acts of unprofessional conduct as defined by statute
or by rule of the division, in collaboration with the board, as
follows:
(a) willfully deceiving or attempting to deceive the
board or its agents as to any relevant matter;
(b) paying rebates to practitioners or any other health
care providers, or entering into any agreement with a medical
viii

practitioner or any other person for the payment or acceptance
of compensation or its economic equivalent for recommending of
the professional services of either party, except that price
discounts that are conditional upon volume purchases are not
prohibited;
(c) misbranding or adulteration of any drug or device,
or the sale, distribution, or dispensing of any misbranded or
adulterated drug or device;
(d) engaging in the sale or purchase of drugs or devices
that are samples or packages bearing the inscription "sample" or
"not for resale" or similar words or phrases;
(e) accepting back and redistribution of any unused
drug, or a part of it, after it has left the premises of any
pharmacy, unless the drug is in the original sealed unit dose
package or manufacturer's sealed container;
(f) being employed as a pharmacist or intern, or sharing
or receiving compensation in any form arising out of an act
incidental to the professional activities in which any person
requires him to engage in any aspects of the practice of
pharmacy in violation of this chapter; and
(g) violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act,
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, or rules and regulations
adopted under either of them.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-11 (1990)
(1) Upon finding grounds for discipline of any person
holding a license, seeking a license, or a renewal license under
this chapter, the division, in collaboration with the board, may
impose one or more of the following penalties:
(a) suspending the offender's license for a term to be
determined by the board;
(b) revoking the offender's license;
(c) restricting the offender's license to prohibit the
offender from performing certain acts or from engaging in the
practice of pharmacy in a particular manner for a term to be
determined by the division, in collaboration with the board;
(d) refusing to renew the offender's license;
(e) placing of the offender on probation and supervision
for a period to be determined by the division in collaboration
with the board.
(2) Any drug outlet found by the board, after a hearing
before the board, to have engaged in the practice of pharmacy in
Utah without a license under this chapter or to have permitted
any person to engage in the practice of pharmacy in Utah from
that drug outlet in violation of this chapter, and any
IX

out-of-state mail service pharmacy found by the board, after a
hearing before the board, to have, without a license under this
chapter:
(a) shipped, mailed, or delivered by any means a dispensed
legend drug to a resident in Utah;
(b) provided information to a resident of this state on
drugs or devices which may include, but is not limited to,
advice relating to therapeutic values, potential hazards, and
uses; or
(c) counseled pharmacy patients residing in this state
concerning adverse and therapeutic effects of drugs, shall be
subject to the following:
(i) revocation, suspension, or probation of license;
(ii) a fine of up to $2,000 for each day in which the
violation occurred;
(iii) assessment of costs associated with the
investigation, hearing, and all litigation required to finally
resolve the finding.
(3) Any person whose license to practice pharmacy in this
state has been suspended, revoked, or restricted under this
chapter, whether voluntarily or by action of the division, may
at reasonable intervals petition the division for reinstatement
of the license. The petition shall be made in writing and in a
form prescribed by the division. Upon investigation and hearing,
the division may grant or deny the petition, or it may modify
its original finding to reflect any circumstances which have
changed sufficiently to warrant the modifications.
(4) Nothing in this chapter bars criminal prosecutions for
violations of this chapter if the violations are deemed criminal
offenses under other statutes of this state or of the United
States.
(5) Final decisions by the division are subject to judicial
review under Title 58, Chapter 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2 (1989)
(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an agency action or
proceeding described in Section 63-46b-l.
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, department,
division, officer, council, office, committee, bureau, or other
administrative unit of this state, including the agency head,
agency employees, or other persons acting on behalf of or under
the authority of the agency head, but does not mean the
Legislature, the courts, the governor, any political subdivision
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of the state, or any administrative unit of a political
subdivision of the state.
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body of
individuals in whom the ultimate legal authority of the agency
is vested by statute.
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceeding authorized
and governed by Section 63-46b-21.
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certification,
approval, registration, charter, or similar form of
authorization required by statute.
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted
by the presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all
persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as
parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of individuals,
partnership, corporation, association, political subdivision or
its units, governmental subdivision or its units, public or
private organization or entity of any character, or another
agency.
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an
individual or body of individuals designated by the agency head,
by the agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an adjudicative
proceeding.
(ii) If fairness to th€* parties is not compromised, an
agency may substitute one presiding officer for another during
any proceeding.
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one
phase of a proceeding need not continue as presiding officer
through all phases of a proceeding.
(i) "Respondent" means a person against whom an
adjudicative proceeding is initiated, whether by an agency or
any other person.
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency required or
authorized by law to review the orders of another agency.
(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from
designating by rule the names or titles of the agency head or
the presiding officers with responsibility for adjudicative
proceedings before the agency.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989).
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit parties
to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of an order by the
agency or by a superior agency, the aggrieved party may file a
written request for review within 30 days after the issuance of
XI

the order with the person or entity designated for that purpose
by the statute or rule.
(b) The request shall:
(i) be signed by the party seeking review;
(ii) state the grounds for review and the relief
requested;
(iii) state the date upon which it was mailed; and
(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer and to
each party.
(2) Within 15 days of the mailing date of the request for
review, or within the time period provided by agency rule,
whichever is longer, any party may file a response with the
person designated by statute or rule to receive the response.
One copy of the response shall be sent by mail to each of the
parties and to the presiding officer.
(3) If a statute or the agency's rules require review of an
order by the agency or a superior agency, the agency or superior
agency shall review the order within a reasonable time or within
the time required by statute or the agency's rules.
(4) To assist in review, the agency or superior agency may
by order or rule permit the parties to file briefs or other
papers, or to conduct oral argument.
(5) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to all
parties.
(6) (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of any
response, other filings, or oral argument, or within the time
required by statute or applicable rules, the agency or superior
agency shall issue a written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the agency head
or by a person designated by the agency for that purpose and
shall be mailed to each party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute or rule permitting or
requiring review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues
reviewed;
(v) the reasons for the disposition;
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding officer or
agency is to be affirmed, reversed, or modified, and whether alJ
or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vii) a notice of any right of further administrative
reconsideration or judicial review available to aggrieved
parties; and
xii

(viii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or
review.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989).
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner
shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the
appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court
shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the
appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings
are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except
that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing
transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as
applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred
by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring
resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed
procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;
X1JL1

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency
by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless
the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1992).
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process
necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and
decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the
district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining,
and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the
small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital
felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any
xiv

other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the ordc^rs on petitions for extraordinary
writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons except
in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(J) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any matter
over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of a final order issued by an
administrative agency of the State of Utah following a formal
adjudicative proceeding.

This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a)(1992) and 6346b-16 (1989).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1990), applies to this appeal.
1.

Was the Division's order revoking Pickett's license to

prescribe controlled substances and placing his pharmacy license
on three years probation arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
its discretion?
Standard of Review:

The Division and Pharmacy Board are

vested with broad discretion to impose disciplinary sanctions
ranging from probation or restricting a license, to revocation or
suspension of a license. Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-9 and -11 (1990),
The court should defer to the agency's exercise of its discretion
in imposing discipline unless the agency's decision is "clearly
unreasonable" or a clear abuse of its discretion.

Johnson Bowles

Co. v. Division of Securities, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah App. 1992),
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(i)(iv) (1989).

1

2.

Did the Division Director's participation in the

proceedings deprive Pickett of due process of law.1
Standard of Review:

The court reviews constitutional

questions for correctness. Morton International, Inc. v. Utah Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
3.

Is the Division's ord€>r invalid due to the lack of a

signature by an appropriate presiding officer?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a question of law

which the court should review for correctness - Morton
International, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
4.

Is the Division's order invalid due the failure of the

Division to obtain the concurrence of the Board of Pharmacy as
required under Utah Code Ann § 58-1-16 (1990)?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a question of law

which the court should review for correctness - Morton
International, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 28, 1992, the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing ("Division") issued a Notice of Agency
Action commencing formal adjudicative proceedings against the
licenses of Appellant, Jack W. Pickett, ("Pickett") to practice
x

.
Pickett does not reveal whether he is challenging the
Division
Director's
conduct
under
the
Utah
or
Federal
Constitutions.
2

as a pharmacist and dispense controlled substances in the State
of Utah.

The Notice of Agency Action and Petition alleged

numerous violations of the Controlled Substances Act and Rules as
well as the Statutes and Rules governing the practice of
Pharmacy.
A formal hearing on the charges was heard on May 26, 19 9 2 by
the Pharmacy Licensing Board and Administrative Law Judge, J.
Steven Eklund.

As a result of the hearing, Pickett's license to

practice as a pharmacist was placed on three months probation and
his license to dispense controlled substances was revoked.

The

order of the Division was subsequently reviewed and affirmed by
the Department of Commerce on July 30, 1992. This appeal
followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Pickett does not dispute the Division's factual
findings, (Brief at 20), the following findings of fact are taken
essentially verbatim from the findings of fact issued by the
Division on June 24, 1992.
At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent, Jack
W. Pickett ("Pickett") has held separate licenses to practice as
a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances in the State
of Utah.

Pickett initially received his pharmacist license

around 1954. Respondent, Servus Drug Co., has been licensed at
3

all times relevant to this proceeding as a pharmacy and
dispensary of controlled substances in the State of Utah.
Pickett is employed by Servus Drug Co. which is owned by
Pickett's spouse.
On twelve separate occasions between May 20, 1991 and July
30, 1991, Pickett dispensed various dosages of either traxene, a
schedule IV controlled substance, or Esgic, a Schedule III
controlled substance, without a physician's authorization to do
so.

On occasions, Pickett dispensed medications in either

unlabeled prescription vials or a paper bag bearing no labels or
instructions.
There is a lack of sufficient evidence that Pickett made
false or forged prescriptions as to dispense the above-stated
controlled substances or other medications. Further, there is a
lack of sufficient evidence to conclude Pickett knew Mr. Schriver
was drug dependant, Pickett acknowledges his prescriptive
practices were improper and he failed to adequately document the
controlled substances or other medications which he dispensed.
Pickett often dispensed those controlled substances or other
medications in the manner requested by Mr. Schriver, who often
suggested the used of either an unlabeled vials or other
inappropriate containers.
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There is no substantial evidence Pickett has improperly
dispensed controlled substances or other medications to other
individuals.

Pickett asserts he has taken remedial measures to

address the acknowledged deficiencies in his practices now under
review.

However, there is a lack of substantial evidence as the

specific nature of the corrective measures Pickett may have taken
in that regard.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I- THE DIVISION AND BOARD IMPOSED A REASONABLE
SANCTION AGAINST PICKETT'S LICENSES.
The decision of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing ("Division") revoking Pickett's license to
dispense controlled substances and placing his pharmacist's
license on three

years probation was reasonable an well within

the discretion vested in the Division and the Pharmacy Board.
The order was not unreasonable in lieu of the Board's past
treatment of professional misconduct by pharmacists and is not
subject to the obscure limitations of stare decisis.

Pickett's

conduct involved numerous serious violations of the controlled
substances act as well as the statutes and rules that govern the
pharmacist profession.

The court should not disturb the sanction

imposed by the Division unless it finds that the Division abused
its discretion and imposed an unreasonable sanction.
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II. THE DIVISION FOLLOWED THE PROPER PROCEDURES FOR
FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS.
Pickett alleges that the Division violated its own statutory
procedures by allowing the participation of the Division Director
as a presiding officer and by failing to obtain the signatures of
the ALJ and Board on the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
order.

Pickett also alleges that the Division failed to obtain

the necessary concurrence from the Board before issuing its
order.
Pickett's arguments should fail for two reasons.

First,

Pickett was given adequate notice concerning the manner in which
the hearing would be conducted. (R./61, 67)

However, Pickett

did not raise any objection prior to, or during the hearing.
Pickett's failure to preserve this issue on appeal prevent him
from obtaining any relief based on alleged procedural errors.
Second, Pickett's procedural challenges to the involvment of
the Division Director as a presiding officer is ignorant of the
fact that the section 58-1-16 as well as sections 58-17-9 and -11
vest authority in the Division and its Director to take
appropriate disciplinary action in concurrence with the Pharmacy
Board.

Utah Code Ann. §§ (1990 and Supp. 1992).

The Division

Director is an agency head as contemplated by the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act and may substitute one presiding
officer for another at different phases of a proceeding.
6

Moreover, Pickett has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced
in any manner by the Division's failure to follow the correct
statutory procedures.
III. THE DIVISION DIRECTOR DID NOT DEPRIVE PICKETT OF
A FAIR HEARING.
Pointed and direct questions asked by the Director, David E.
Robinson, at the hearing does not constitute a violation of due
process.

Given the minimal detail surrounding the events that

led up to the bringing of disciplinary proceedings against
Pickett's licenses, the Director was entitled to ask questions
and probe into matters that were not adequately addressed during
direct and cross-examination by respective counsel.

The

Director's questions did not rise to a level of due process
violation.

Moreover, no objection was raised by Pickett, who was

represented by counsel, to any of the questions posed by the
Director.

Consequently, Pickett has waive the right to raise

this as an issue on appeal.
IV.

THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WAS NOT BIASED AGAINST PICKETT

Pickett has raised insufficient grounds to even cast an
inference of bias on the part of the Executive Director of the
Department of Commerce.

There can be no inference of bias by

virtue of the fact that David Robinson was appointed by the last
Executive Director of the Department of Commerce (and approved by
the Governor)

The Executive Director conducted agency review in
7

accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.

No

rehearing was required and no oral argument was taken because
none was requested.

(R./l)

V. PICKETT WAIVED THE REQUIREMENT OF A QUORUM
Pickett urges that he waived the requirement of a quorum so
that the hearing could be conducted but intended for there to be
a quorum of the board to deliberate on his case. (Brief at: 17)
Other than Pickett's bald assertion there is not support for his
contention in the record.

His intent that a complete quorum

deliberate on his case was not expressed to the Division nor is
it reflected in the record.

Consequently,

Pickett has not

marshalled the evidence to support his argument on this issue on
appeal.
ARGUMENT
1. THE DIVISION'S ORDER REVOKING PICKETT'S CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE LICENSE AND PLACING HIS PHARMACIST'S LICENSE
ON PROBATION WAS REASONABLE AND WITHIN THE DIVISION'S
DISCRETION.
Pickett does not dispute the Division's factual findings,
nor has he ever denied that the conduct he engaged in was
violative of the statutory and regulatory standards governing the
dispensing of controlled substances or the licensure of
pharmacists. (Brief at 7-8, 20)

However, Pickett urges on appeal

that the sanction imposed by the Division is not justified in
light of the Pharmacy Board's findings of fact and prior
8

decisions of the Pharmacy Board in prior cases.2

Before

addressing this issue on the merits, it is necessary to determine
which standard of review the court will apply in reviewing the
sanction imposed by the Division and the Board.
A. ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD OF REVIEW SHOULD APPLY
TO DIVISION'S IMPOSITION OF A SANCTION.
In reviewing Pickett's appeal on this issue, the Court of
Appeals should review the Division's order under the abuse of
discretion standard of review.

See, Johnson-Bowles v. Division

of Securities, 829 P.2d 101, 115, (1992)(Applying Morton
standard of review analysis.)

3

In Johnson, the court reviewed a

statute granting the Division of Securities the power to impose
sanctions and concluded that the Division possessed broad
discretionary authority to impose disciplinary action against
registered brokers or agents of the Division.4 JEd. at 116.
No adverse findings or sanction was imposed against
appellant, Servus Drug Co.
It is unclear why the company is
appealing other than for reasons that the sanction imposed against
Pickett bears some negative consequences for the company.
3

. Morton International, Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm'n, 814 P. 2d
581 (Utah 1991). Sparing a detailed standard of review analysis,
Morton provides a comprehensive analysis of cases addressing the
standards of appellate review from administrative agency decisions.
A

. The statute granting sanction powers to the Division of
Securities provides in pertinent part:
Upon approval by the executive director and a
majority of the Securities Advisory Board, the
executive
director may
issue and
order
9

Based on the broad range of disciplinary options available to the
Division, the court concluded that the type of sanction and the
"reasonableness" of the sanction "is a matter of agency
discretion" which would not be disturbed unless "clearly
unreasonable or otherwise an abuse of discretion." Id.
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing,
like the Division of Securities, is a subdivision of the
Department of Commerce and likewise has been given a broad range
of regulatory powers including the express authority to impose
discipline against licensee's who violate the applicable statutes
and rules of the

profession.

First, in a more general

delegation, section 58-1-15 provides that the Division "may
refuse to issue or renew, and may suspend, revoke, or place on
probation the license of any licensee who: (1) is or has been
guilty of unprofessional conduct, as defined by statute or rule .
. ." Utah Code Ann. § (19 9 2 Cum Supp.).
Similar provisions, but more specifically tailored to
pharmacy profession, are two provisions which require the
Division to act in collaboration with the Pharmacy Board when

denying, suspending or revoking andy agent,
broker-dealer,
or
investment
adviser
registration if he finds that the order is in
the public interest . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-6(1)(1989).
10

imposing sanctions against licensed pharmacists.

Section 58-17-9

provides that the Division, in collaboration with the Board, may
refuse to issue or renew, or may suspend, revoke, or restrict the
license of any person, upon one or more of grounds (which are
both numerous and lengthy) stated in that provision.
Ann. § 58-17-9 (1992 Supp.)

Utah Code

In addition, there is section

58-17-11 which provides that:
(1) Upon finding grounds for discipline of any person
holding a license, seeking a license, or a renewal
license under this chapter, the division, in
collaboration with the board, may impose one or more of
the following penalties:
(a) suspending the offender's license for a term to be
determined by the board;
(b) revoking the offender's license;
(c) restricting the offender's license to prohibit the
offender from performing certain acts or from engaging
in the practice of pharmacy in a particular manner for
a term to be determined by the division, in
collaboration with the board;
(d) refusing to renew the offender's license;
(e) placing of the offender on probation and
supervision for a period to be determined by the
division in collaboration with the board.
Utah Code Ann. § (1990)
Given the broad grant of authority to the Division and Board
to impose sanctions for violations of its statutes, the court
should defer to the Division's discretion and not disturb the
Division's order unless it found to be a clear abuse of its
11

discretion.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(h)(i)(1989).

B, THE SANCTION IMPOSED BY THE BOARD AND DIVISION WAS
NOT AN ABUSE THEIR DISCRETION
Besides finding numerous violations of the statutes £ind
rules applicable to professioncil pharmacists (which are
uncontroverted), the Pharmacy Board and the Division concluded
that Pickett was "grossly neglxgent in his practice of pharmacy."
(R./40)

The Board also characterized Pickett's "misconduct" as a

"egregious departure from those standards which govern his
profession." (R./41)
Specifically, the Board found that Pickett dispensed
prescription drugs on twelve separate occasions "without any
practitioner's authorization to do so." (R./40)

The Board also

found that "[ujnder the circumstancesr [Pickett] should have
known Mr. Schriver was attempting to obtain drugs by either fraud
or misrepresentation." (R./40)
Pickett also improperly dispensed medications by placing
controlled substances in an unlabeled vial or paper bag.
(R./l)(Trans, at 7, 17-18) Pickett also failed to properly label
the medication indicating what kind of medicine it was and the
instructions for administering the correct dosage. (R./l)(Trans
at 7, 18).
Pickett's conduct resulted in the bringing of a criminal
charge which was resolved by Pickett's plea of no contest to a
12

charge of Illegal Dispensing of a Controlled Substance, a third
degree felony.(R./56)(Trans at 13f 14, 30, 31)

The conviction

was resolved by a diversion agreement between Pickett and the
Second District Court in Davis County.

While the conviction did

not serve as the basis of the Division's disciplinary action it
does serve to illustrate the serious nature of Pickett's
misconduct.
The action taken by the Board and Division was reasonable
due to the serious nature of Pickett's misconduct and was imposed
in order to protect the public health and safety.

The Board and

Division manifested their intent to protect the public while
monitoring Pickett's future conduct and to "prompt necessary
corrective and remedial action." (R./41)
Pickett asserts that the revocation of his license to
dispense controlled substances is "tantamount to depriving him of
his lifetime profession" (Brief at 2 ) . However, a review of the
Division's order reflects an intent to protect the public while
monitoring and promoting rehabilitative efforts on the part of
Pickett.

First, no action was taken against the license of

Servus Drug Co. which is owned by Pickett's spouse.(R./36)
Moreover, Pickett's pharmacist license was placed on three years
probation.

Consequently,

Pickett will be able to maintain

viable employment at Servus Drug during the probationary period
13

and there is nothing to preclude Servus Drug from dispensing
controlled substances so long as Servus Drug employs someone with
a valid Utah controlled substance license to issue such
prescriptions.
The order also reflects an intent to monitor Pickett's
practices and encourage rehabilitative efforts on his own behalf.
The order requires to Pickett to submit a practice plan requiring
Servus Drug to employ a pharmacist to "establish proper record
keeping, inventory control and dispensary procedures for
controlled substances at the pharmacy." (R./42)

Pickett is also

required to meet with the Board every month for three months and
then every six months thereafter until his probation is complete.
(R./42) The purpose of the meetings is to allow the Board to
review and adequately monitor the terms of the probation and
assure that proper procedures are being implemented at Servus
Drug.

The Division will also perform period audits of the

controlled substance records. (R./42)

Finally, Pickett will be

required to take the jurisprudence examination to assure that he
is aware of the laws and rules governing the practice of
pharmacy.
The order issued by the Division and Board is an excellent
example of effective governmental regulation.

Rather than merely

sanctioning Pickett and leaving him to go his own way.
14

The

Division and Board is assuming an active role in the monitoring
and rehabilitation of Pickett's practices.

It is difficult to

imagine a more effective way to assure the public protection
while preserving Pickett's property interest in his license to
practice as a pharmacist.

It is worthy to note that the

revocation of Pickett's controlled substance license is not the
equivalent of a license death penalty.

It is possible for a

license to be reissued after revocation in the event the Division
and the Board is

satisfied that the licensee is competent to

practice and the public health and safety is no longer under any
threat.
C. PRIOR SANCTIONS OF THE PHARMACY BOARD AND DIVISION
ARE NOT CONTROLLING
Pickett urges that the order of the Division and Board is
out of line with sanctions imposed by the Division and Board in
prior cases. (Brief at 20). Pickett cites to ten case that were
handled by the Pharmacy Board between 1986-1989.

Beyond his own

brief summary of the facts and results in those cases, Pickett
has not met his burden of showing that the decision of the Board
and Division is clearly unreasonable.

The current Pharmacy Board

is not bound by the disciplinary actions of past boards.
Administrative agencies are generally free as a matter of law "of
the limitations of stare decisis." Williams v. Public Service
Commission, 754 P.2d 41, 52 (Utah 1988); see also, Reaveley v.
15

Public Service Commission, 436 P.2d 797, 20 Utah 2d 237 (1968);
Almon, Inc., v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n., 696 P.2d 1210, 1213
(Utah 1985) .
Merely because a sanction appears more harsh than imposed in
other cases does not render the sanction invalid.

In Butz v.

Glover Livestock Commission Co., 411 U.S. 182, 187, 36 L.Ed.2d
142, 93 S.Ct. 1455 (1973), the Supreme Court confirmed that the
employment of a sanction within the authority of an
administrative agency is not rendered invalid in a particular
case because it is more severe than sanctions imposed in other
cases.
The order of the Division and the Pharmacy Board was
specifically tailored to meet the specific circumstances
surrounding Pickett's violations.

As specified above, the order

is specifically designed to protect the public while allowing
Pickett to practice his profession.

The order also demonstrates

an intent to protect the public and rehabilitate the offender.
Like judges in regular courts of law, the Board must be given the
discretion to mete out discipline in response to the unique
circumstances of the case before it.

In the instant case, the

Board and Division has struck an appropriate balance to allow
Pickett to continue to engage in his profession while providing
adequate protection to the public.
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2. PICKETT'S FAILURE TO RAISE PROCEDURAL ERRORS AT OR
BEFORE THE HEARING CONSTITUTE WAIVER.
The Division's failure to comply with its own statutory
procedures is one of the grounds asserted by Pickett to support
reversal of the Division's order. (Brief at 16.)

Before

addressing this issue on the merits, the Division objects to
Pickett's failure to properly preserve this issue on appeal.

In

its Notice of Agency Action of January 28, 1992 (R./67), the
Division provided notice to Pickett that he was entitled to a
hearing "conducted before the Pharmacy Board." (R./67)

The

notice also stated,
During the hearing, you will have the opportunity to
present evidencef argue, respond, conduct crossexamination and submit rebuttal evidence to the Board.
After the hearing the Board will submit findings of
fact, conclusions of law and a recommended order to the
Director of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing for his subsequent review and
action.
The same notice also identified the presiding officer as, J.
Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge. (R./67)
On April 21, 1992 a Notice of Hearing was delivered to
Pickett.

That notice identified a hearing date and reiterated

that Pickett could present evidence to the Pharmacy Board and
that Board would then submit a recommended order to the Director
of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for
his subsequent review and action. (R./61)
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Pickett was provided with notice well in advance of the
hearing of the Board's and Division Director's involvment in the
administrative proceeding.

However, the record, including the

transcript is devoid of any objection prior to, or during the
hearing, over the propriety of the procedures being followed by
the Division.

Because of Pickett's failure to raise any

objection to the procedures at or before the hearing, his appeal
on these issues should not be reviewed by the court.

In

Brinkerhoff, v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), the Court of Appeals declared that "[i]t is axiomatic in
our adversary system that a party must raise an objection in an
earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in
subsequent proceedings."

Appellants may not allege errors on

appeal if the defects could have been cured by the trial court.
The Brinkerhoff court held that this long established principle
"applies equally to administrative proceedings. " JEd,.

Based on

this principle, the Brinkerhoff held that an appellant had waived
his right to appeal an administrative agencies failure to notify
the appellant that the hearing he was to appear at was to be
formal or informal. JEd.

This rule applied not withstanding that

the appellant had raised his objection during closing argument.
Id.

See also, People Ex. Rel Woodward v. Brown, 770 P.2d 1373,

1375 (Colo. App. 1989)(Physician's failure to raise claim that
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delay in bringing disciplinary proceeding violated his rights to
due process constituted waiver and were not considered on appeal)
3. THE PHARMACY BOARD AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION
OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING ARE
APPROPRIATE PRESIDING OFFICERS.
For the first time appeal, Picket contends that proceedings
below were defective due to the Division's failure to follow the
appropriate procedures.
faulty assumptions.

Pickett bases his contentions on two

First, that the Director of the Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing is not the agency head
for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(h)(1989). (Brief at 16,
17)

Second that the ALJ and not the Division Director should

have issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order.
(Brief at 17)
Section 63-46b-2(h), section defines the term "presiding
officer" mean "an agency head or an individual or group of
individuals designated by the agency head . . .

to conduct an

administrative proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § (1989).

The term

"Agency Head" is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-2(c)(1989) as
a "individual or body of individuals in whom the ultimate legal
authority of the agency is vested by statute."
Pickett's tortured interpretation of section 63-46b-2(c)
negates the Division Director's role in the license disciplinary
hearings in favor the Executive Director of the Department of
19

Commerce.

While it true that the Department of Commerce is a

superior agency to the Division and that the Department Director
is the "agency head" over the department, this does not compel
the conclusion that the executive director is the agency head
over adjudications conducted by the Division.
The Director of the Division of Occupational and
Professional licensing is vested with authority to "perform all
duties, functions, and responsibilities assigned to the division
by law or rule with the collaboration and assistance of the
boards established under this title."
(Supp 1992).

Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-4

One of the Division's duties involves "issuing,

refusing to issue, revoking, suspending, renewing, refusing to
renew, or otherwise acting upon any license or licensee." Utah
Code Ann. § 58-1-6 (Supp 1992).
Among the Division Director's duties is to conduct
adjudicative proceedings in matters of professional discipline.
Section 58-1-16 concerns the Director's powers in connection with
disciplinary actions:
(1) (a) Before suspending, revoking, placing on
probationer refusing to renew a license, and before
issuing a cease and desist order, the division shall
comply with the procedures and reguirements of Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act; . . .
(b) By complying with the procedures and requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, the director may hold or
cause to be held administrative hearings regarding any
other matter affecting the division or the activities
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of any person authorized to practice his occupation or
profession under this title.
(2) (a) All adjudicative proceedings shall be held
before an appropriate presiding officer, as designated
by the director, (b) The presiding officer shall make
written recommendations for action, findings of fact,
and conclusions of law.
(c) The director, with the concurrence of the
appropriate board, may issue a written order based on
the recommendations but is not bound to follow the
recommendations of the presiding officer.
(d) If the director does not issue an order within ten
days after the presiding officer has made the
recommendations, the recommendations of the presiding
officer shall become the order.
Utah Code Ann § (Supp. 1992).

The reference to "director" in the

above statutes refers specifically to the director of the
Division and not the Department Director. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-2
(1990)("Director" means the director of the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing.).
As the head of the Division, the Director may designate who
will serve as the appropriate presiding officer at any given
phase of a adjudicative proceeding.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

2(h), applicable to Division proceedings by statute, provides:
(i) "Presiding officer" means an agency head, or an
individual or body of individuals designated by the
agency head, by the agency's rules, or by statute to
conduct an adjudicative proceeding.
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not compromised,
an agency may substitute one presiding officer for
another during any proceeding.
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding officer at one
phase of a proceeding need not continue as
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presiding officer through all phases of a
proceeding.
Id. (emphasis added).

The Director is within his statutory

authority when he designates an ALJ and the appropriate board to
act as the "appropriate presiding officer" at a hearing.
Designation of the Board as the presiding officer for
purposes of issuing an order is also contemplated by statutes
governing the Department and the Division (See eg. U.C.A. §§
13-1-125 and

58-1-8.5).

The designation is "appropriate" since

the Board, not the ALJ, is the entity of peers with specialized
knowledge and expertise to evaluate and weigh the evidence.
Although the Notice of Agency Action identified Judge Steven
Eklund as the "presiding officer"

the notice also indicated that

the Pharmacy Board would be receiving evidence and issuing its
recommended findings to the Director for action. (R./61, 67)
This consistent with section 58-17-9 which vests authority in the
Division, in collaboration with the Board, to refuse to issue or

3

. Utah Code Ann. 13-1-12. Order by hearing officer or body Appeal of order to the division director or the executive director.
(1) (a) At the close of an adjudicative proceeding, ihe
administrative law judge or an occupational board or
representative committee with £issistance from the administrative
law judge, shall issue an order.
(b) The order may be appealed to the executive director or
the division director for review.
(2) If a division director is unable for any reason 10
fairly review or rule upon an order of the administrative law
judge or a board or committee, the executive director shall
review and rule upon the order. (Supp. 1992)
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renew, suspend, revoke, or restrict the license of pharmacists
who are found in violation of any one of a number of statutory
and regulatory standards.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-17-9 and -11 (1992

Cum Supp.)
In addition, the fact that Division Director signed the
order adopting the recommended order of the Pharmacy Board was
not improper.

The Division Director, was acting as the presiding

officer at the time he signed the Order.

Moreover, other than

Pickett's bald assertion of substantial prejudice, he fails to
articulate a single reason how he was prejudiced by the Board's
failure also to sign the Order.

The record reflects that the

findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order were
issued by the Board (R./35) and subsequently adopted as the final
order by the Division Director. (R./34).

This is consistent with

requirements of Title 58 requiring a concurrence of the Board and
Director and the Utah Administrative Procedures Act requiring
that orders be signed by the presiding officer.
Any confusion over who was acting as presiding officer was
resolved at the hearing.

Pickett's failure to raise any

objection to the adjudicative procedures below constitutes waiver
of his right to raise this as an issue on appeal or claim
substantial prejudice.
4. THE DIVISION DIRECTOR'S PARTICIPATION AT THE
HEARING DID NOT DEPRIVE PICKETT OF A FAIR HEARING.
Pickett contends that the Division Director's involvement at
the hearing deprived him of due process. (Brief at 8, 18)
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Specifically, Pickett mischaracterizes Director Robinson's
questions posed to him as aggressive interrogation.
8).

(Brief at

It well recognized that litigants in administrative

adjudications have a "due process right to receive a fair trial
in front of a fair tribunal." Nelson v. Department of Employment
Sec. , 801 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah App. 1990); Bunnell v. Industrial
Comm'n of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333, (Utah 1987).

However,

"administrative proceedings neexi not possess the formality of
judicial proceedings." Nelson at: 163.
Pickett disapproves of the manner in which the Division
Director, asked various questions of him during the trial.

A

partial transcript of the proceedings, including the questions
posed by Director Robinson have been provided to the court.

It

difficult to fathom from the transcript how the questions posed
by the Director can be characterized in good faith as aggressive
interrogation.

Not a single objection was raised by Pickett, or

his counsel to the questions as they were being asked.

Moreover,

the Director's questions were merely aimed at filling in gaps in
the story and eliciting a certain degree of detail that was
lacking from Pickett's testimony.

Because the relevant facts

were not in dispute, few questions were asked by either counsel
for the Division or Pickett's counsel about the relevant events
that transpired.

Moreover, Pickett's main defense was to bring
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in factors to explain and attempt to mitigate matters in his
favor. (Transcript at 9 ) .

It appears from the follow up

questions asked by Director Robinson, that he was asking
questions of Pickett to determine whether Pickett could
appreciate the serious nature of the mistakes he admittedly made.
Pickett did not object to the questions, nor was he deprived
of the ability to have his counsel engage in any rehabilitative
questions that counsel might have considered appropriate.

Like

Pickett's failure to object to the alleged procedural mistakes
claimed as error on this appeal, his failure to make an object to
the questions asked by the Director constitutes a waiver of his
right to raise this issue on appeal. Ellison, Inc., v. Board of
Review, 749 P. 2d 1280, 1285 (Utah App. 1988).

Moreover, there is

no evidence, and none offered by Pickett, that demonstrates that
the Director's questions had any impact on the Pharmacy Board's
findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Pickett also has also

failed to show how the Director's participation predisposed the
board to enter a more harsh sanction against Pickett.
5. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S REVIEW DID NOT DEPRIVE PICKETT
OF DUE PROCESS
Pickett urges that his right to due process were violated by
the Executive Director's review of the Division's order.
According to Pickett, the alleged due process violation is
apparently the result of some inherent bias on the part of the
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Executive Director due to the fact that the Division Director is
his appointee.6

(Brief at 19)

Pickett also assumes, without

any support from the record, that the Executive Director made his
decision without further hearing or independent consideration.
(Brief at 19)
Pickett has not even raised an appreciable issue of bias on
the part of the Executive Director that would even warrant a
minimal response.

It is troubling how Pickett can even raise an

inference of bad motive or impartiality without so much as a
shred of evidence.
Agency review by the Department was conducted pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-12 (1989).

Both the Division and Pickett

submitted briefs asserting their positions.

It is also apparent

from the Order on Review (R./ 1-9), that neither Pickett nor
Division's counsel requested oral argument. (R./l)
none was granted.

Consequently,

Pickett's bald assertions of impropriety and

bias is completely spurious and unfounded.
6. PICKETT WAIVED THE RIGHT TO HAVE A QUORUM OF THE
BOARD PRESENT.
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended
order indicates that only two members of the five member Pharmacy
6

. Actually, David E. Robinson was appointed by David Buhler
who no longer serves as the Executive Director.
The current
Director, Ted Stewart, did not appoint David E. Robinson.
The
Director also serves at the pleasure of the Governor.
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Board were present to participate at the hearing.(R./36)

The

record further reflects that Pickett waived the requirement that
a quorum be present. (R./36)

Pickett now urges that he only

intended to proceed with a hearing with two board member present
but did not waive consideration by a quorum of the Board. (Brief
at 17 ) .
Other than Pickett's bald assertion, there is no evidence on
the record to support his assertion.

Pickett's intent was

apparently silent when waiving the requirement of a quorum.

The

partial transcript lacks any indication of what Pickett intended.
Consequently,

Pickett cannot meet his burden on this appeal and

should not be permitted to take back his waiver because he
unexpressed intentions differed from what he received.
assertion is created as an afterthought.

Pickett's

The lack of a quorum

was not raised on review with the Department and is not supported
by any evidence whatsoever on the record.
CONCLUSION
The Division's Order revoking Pickett's controlled substance
license and placing his pharmacists license on three years
probation was reasonable and within the Division's discretion.
Pickett's allegations of procedural defects at his hearing are
without merit and have not been properly preserved on this
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appeal.

Consequently, the Division requests that its Order be

upheld on review.
Submitted this

^yMn

day of January, 1993

C^

ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

jtff/ff

, c e r t i f y t h a t on

I served two copies of the foregoing

K/rZf.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF to

George K. Fadel, counsel for Petitioner in this matter, bymailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid to the following address:
GEORGE K. FADEL
170 West 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010
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FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
JACK W. PICKETT
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
AND THE LICENSES OF
8ERVUS DRUG CO.
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN
THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER

Case No. OPL-92-6

The attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommended Order are hereby adopted by the Director of the
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing of the State of
Utah.

Respondent Jack W. Pickett's license to dispense

controlled substances is thus revoked, effective thirty (30) days
from the date of this Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the revoked license, both wall
and wallet sizes, as well as the embossed certificate, thus be
surrendered to the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.
Dated this

^y5^

day of June, 1992.

David E. Robinson
Director
S,,E A L

,1 W

•'.

'"'A* Administrative review of this Order may be obtained by
filing a request for agency review with the executive director of
the Depjartinent within thirty (30) days after issuance of this
Order. Any such request must comply with the requirements of the
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-12(l) and R151-46b-12 of the departmental
rules which govern agency review.
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OP OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
JACK W. PICKETT
TO PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND
TO DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
AND THE LICENSES OF
SERVUS DRUG CO.
AS A PHARMACY AND AS A DISPENSARY
FOR CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN
THE STATE OF UTAH

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
Case No. OPL-92-6

Appearances:
Delia M. Welch for the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
George K. Fadel for Respondents
BY THE BOARD:
A hearing was conducted in the above-entitled matter on May
26, 1992 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for
the Department of Commerce, and the State Board of Pharmacy.
Board members present for the hearing were Dennis R. White and
Don Sterling.

The remaining Board members, Frank Morris, Mark L.

Johnson and De'lbert A. Park, were absent.

David E. Robinson, the

Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing, was present.

Respondents consented that the hearing

be conducted as scheduled, despite the lack of a majority of
Board members present for the hearing.
offered and received.

Thereafter, evidence was

The Board, being fully advised in the premises, now enters
the following:
FINDINGS OP FACT
1.

Respondent Jack W. Pickett (hereinafter, Respondent) is,

and at all times relevant to this proceeding has been, licensed
to practice as a pharmacist and to dispense controlled substances
in the State of Utah.

Respondent has been a licensed pharmacist

since approximately 1954. Respondent Servus Drug Co.
(hereinafter, Servus Drug Co.) is, and at all time relevant to
this proceeding has been, licensed as a pharmacy and a dispensary
for controlled substances in the State of Utah.

This record does

not reflect the exact date those licenses were issued.
Respondent is employed by Servus Drug Co., a business which is
owned by Respondent's wife.
2.

On twelve occasions between May 20, 1991 and July 30,

1991, Respondent dispensed various dosages of either Tranxene, a
Schedule IV controlled substance, Esgic, a Schedule III
controlled substance, or Soma, a legend drug, to a Todd Schriver.
In certain instances, Respondent dispensed those controlled
substances without a physician's authorization to do so. On
occasion, Respondent dispensed medications in either unlabeld
prescription vials or a paper bag bearing no labels or
instructions.
3.

There is a lack of sufficient evidence Respondent made

false or forged prescriptions as to dispense the above-stated
controlled substances or other medications.

Further, there is a

lack of sufficient evidence to conclude Respondent knew Mr.
2

Schriver was drug dependent.

Respondent acknowledges his

prescriptive practices were improper and he failed to adequately
document the controlled substances or other medications which he
dispensed.

Respondent often dispensed those controlled

substances or other medications in the manner requested by Mr.
Schriver# who often suggested the use of either unlabeled vials
or other inappropriate containers.
4.

There is no substantial evidence Respondent has

improperly dispensed controlled substances or other medications
to other individuals.

Respondent asserts he has taken remedial

measures to address the acknowledged deficiencies in his
practices now under review.

However, there is a lack of

substantial evidence as to the specific nature of corrective
measures Respondent may have undertaken in that regard.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. Section 58-17-9 provides the Division, in
collaboration with the Board, may suspend, revoke or restrict the
license of a pharmacist on one or more of the following grounds:
(5) being found by the board to be in
violation of this chapter or rules adopted
under this chapter;
(6) acts of unprofessional conduct as
defined by statute or by rule of the
division, in collaboration with the board, as
follows:
. . . .

(g) violation of the federal
Controlled Substance Act, the Utah
Controlled Substance Act, or rules
and regulations adopted under
either of them.
Section 58-17-10(1) provides it is unlawful for any person to:
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(m) dispense a prescription drug to anyone
who does not have a prescription from a
practitioner or to anyone who he knows or
should know is attempting to obtain drugs by
fraud or misrepresentation.
Section 58-17-22 further provides:
(8) Each drug or device dispensed shall
have a label securely affixed to the
container indicating the following:
(a) the name, address, and
telephone number of the pharmacy;
(b) the serial number;
• • • •

(d) the name of the patient . .
(e) the name of the prescriber;
(f) the directions for use and
cautionary statements, if any,
which are contained in the
prescription order or are needed;
(g) the trade, generic or
chemical name, amount dispensed and
strength of dosage form, but if
multiple ingredient products with
established proprietary or
nonproprietary names are
prescribed, those products' names
may be used.
R153-17-12 of the rules which govern the practice of pharmacy
further define unprofessional conduct to include:
(1) Violating any federal or state statute
or rule dealing with controlled substances or
other drugs;
(2) Fraud or deception in the practice of
pharmacy;
(3) Negligence or incompetence in the
practice of pharmacy.
With respect to a license to dispense controlled substances,
Section 58-37-6(4)(a) provides such a license "may be suspended,
placed on probation, or revoked" by the department upon finding
that the licensee has:

4

(vi) violated any department rule that
reflects adversely on the licensee's
reliability and integrity with respect to
controlled substances;
In addition to the acts and practices set forth in the juststated statute, R156-37-9 provides the Division may revoke,
suspend, restrict or place on probation a controlled substance
license if the licensee:
(2) has violated any federal or state law
relating to controlled substances;
• • • •

(7) violates restrictions upon controlled
substances, prescriptions and administration
as contained in these rules; and/or
(8) knowingly prescribes, sells, gives
away or administers, directly or indirectly,
or offers to prescribe, sell, furnish, give
away, or administer any controlled substance
to a drug dependent person, as defined in
Utah Code Ann., 58-37-2(14), except for
legitimate medical purposes as permitted by
law.
Section 58-37-6(7)(a) provides:
No person may write or authorize a
prescription for a controlled substance
unless he is:
(i) a practitioner authorized to
prescribe drugs and medicine under
the laws of this state or under the
laws of another state having
similar standards; and
(ii) licensed under this chapter
or under the laws of another state
having similar standards.
Section 58-37-6(7)(c) further provides:
(i) No controlled substance may be
dispensed without the written prescription of
a practitioner, if the written prescription
is required by the federal Controlled
Substances Act.
Section 58-37-8(3)(a) also provides it is unlawful for any
person:
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(i) who is subject to this chapter to
distribute or dispense a controlled substance
in violation of this chapter;
Finally, Section 58-37-8(4)(a) provides it is unlawful for any
person knowingly and intentionally:
(iii) to make any false or forged
prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same,
or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this
chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent
material information in any application,
report, or other document required to be kept
by this chapter or to willfully make any
false statement in any prescription, order,
report, or record required by this chapter;
Respondent violated Section 58-17-10(1)(m) when he dispensed
prescription drugs and controlled substances without any
practitioner's authorization to do so.

Under the circumstances,

Respondent should have known Mr. Schriver was attempting to
obtain drugs by either fraud or misrepresentation.

Respondent

failed to comply with Section 58-17-22(8) when he dispensed drugs
in containers without appropriate labeling.

Respondent violated

R153-17-12(2) when he prepared documents to purportedly reflect a
physician's authorization for the medication which was dispensed
when, in fact, no authorization was made.
Respondent also violated Section 58-37-6(7)(a) and Section
58-37-6(7)(c)(i).

By reason thereof, Respondent engaged in

unprofessional conduct, as defined in R153-17-12(1).

He was also

grossly negligent in his practice of pharmacy, which reflects
unprofessional conduct with respect to R153-17-12(3).

However,

there is a lack of sufficient evidence to find and thus conclude
Respondent violated Section 58-37-8(4) (a)(iii) or (iv) .
6
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Thus, Respondent has engaged in unprofessional conduct and a
proper basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction with respect
to his licensure as a pharmacist and his ability to dispense
controlled substances in this state.

However, no proper basis

exists to enter any disciplinary sanction with respect to the
license of Servus Drug Co. as a pharmacy or a dispensary of
controlled substances.
Respondents misconduct represents an egregious departure
from those standards which govern his profession.

Further,

Respondent engaged in such misconduct on numerous occasions.
Respondents conduct does not merely reflect a singular,
haphazard exercise of his duties as a pharmacist. Rather,
Respondent repeatedly failed to properly dispense controlled
substances and other medication.

Various statutes and rules

appropriately restrict the manner in which controlled substances
may be dispensed, yet Respondent frequently failed to comply with
the requirements of those statutes and rules.
Therefore, an appropriately severe sanction should enter
with regard to Respondents license to dispense controlled
substances.

Further, adequate restrictions must exist to

appropriately protect the public health, safety and welfare and
ensure Respondent continually complies with those standards which
govern his profession.

The recommended order set forth below is

thus necessary to adequately monitor Respondents future conduct
as a pharmacist, to appropriately prompt necessary corrective and
remedial action required of Respondent and to ensure controlled
substances are dispensed in a manner consistent with the dictates
7

of state and federal law.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to dispense
controlled substances is revoked.
It is further ordered Respondent's license as a pharmacist
be placed on probation for three (3) years, subject to the
following terms and conditions:
1. Within thirty (30) days from the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted by the
Director of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, Respondent shall
submit a written practice plan, which shall
be subject to Board review and approval.
Said plan shall provide for another
pharmacist to be employed by Servus Drug Co.
Said pharmacist shall thereafter establish
proper record keeping, inventory control and
dispensary procedures for controlled
substances at the pharmacy.
2. Respondent and the just-referenced
pharmacist shall initially meet with the
Board each month during the first three (3)
months of this probationary term.
Thereafter, Respondent and the pharmacist
shall meet with the Board every six (6)
months. During those meetings, the Board
will review the ongoing efforts to implement
proper record keeping practices, appropriate
management of controlled substance inventory
and proper procedures with regard to any
controlled substances which are dispensed
through the pharmacy in question.
3.' The Division shall periodically audit
the controlled substance records of Servus
Drug Co.
4. Within ninety (90) days from the date
this Recommended Order may be adopted,
Respondent shall successfully complete the
jurisprudence examination generally required
of all pharmacists licensed to practice in
this state.
Should Respondent fail to comply with the terms and
8
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conditions set forth herein, or otherwise violate any statute or
rule which governs his license as a pharmacist, further
proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made whether a
sanction of greater severity than that set forth herein is
warranted.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the
^ /
day of June, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, RECOMMENDED ORDER AND ORDER was sent first
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Jack W. Pickett
Servus Drug
55 North Main
Bountiful, UT 84010
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful Ut 84010

W^Mi IMV"
i'U/r/r
Carol W. Inglesby *
Administrative Assistant

ORDER ON AGENCY REVIEW

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES
OF JACK W. PICKETT TO
PRACTICE AS A PHARMACIST AND TO
DISPENSE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
AND THE LICENSES OF
SERVUS DRUG CO, AS A PHARMACY
AND AS A DISPENSARY FOR
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON REVIEW
CASE NO. OPL-92-6

INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 1992, following a hearing on a petition involving
Jack W. Pickett and Servus Drug Co.

("Respondents") before the

Administrative Law Judge and the State Board of Pharmacy, the
Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
(the "Division") adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Recommended Order of the Board.

The Order revoked Respondent

Pickett's license to dispense controlled substances and placed his
license as a pharmacist on probation for three years, subject to
certain terms and conditions.

Respondent was represented by an

attorney throughout the proceeding, as well as on review.

He

requested agency review on July 1, 1992, and also was given until
July 27, 1992, to supplement his brief requesting review.

Oral

argument was neither requested nor held.
In his request for review, Respondent requests that the Order
be modified so that he may continue as a licensed pharmacist.
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STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Review is conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
63-4613-12, and Rule 151-46b-12

of

the Rules

of

Procedure

for

Adjudicative Proceedings before the Department of Commerce.
THE ISSUES REVIEWED
1.

Whether the Order contains procedural defects sufficient

to warrant overturning it;
2.

Whether

Respondent

was

unfairly

deprived

of

a

fair

hearing where the Division Director was present and participated in
questioning Respondent, thus either becoming an "advocate" rather
than a "tribunal", or unduly influencing the Recommended Order;
3-

Whether the Order is not supported by the Findings of

Fact; and
4.

Whether

the

Order

of

revocation

was

arbitrary

and

capricious, particularly when compared with penalties in other
cases.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent does not contest the Findings of Fact entered

into by the Board, and consequently they are adopted herein for
purposes of this review.
2.

The Order found that Respondent has engaged in acts or

conduct which violated §58-17-10 (1) (m) ; §58-17-22 (8) ; and Rule 15317-12.

Specifically, it found that Respondent had, on twelve

occasions,
substances,

dispensed
as well

authorization,

or

Schedule
as

a

without

IV

legend
proper
-2-

and

Schedule

drug, without
labels,

to

III
a
one

controlled
physician's
customer.

3
Respondent apparently acknowledged that his prescriptive practices
were improper and that he did not adequately document dispensing
certain drugs.

The Findings concluded that there was a lack of

sufficient evidence to find that Respondent made false or forged
prescriptions, as had been charged in the Petition.
3.

Respondent argues as grounds for review that the Findings

of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order were not signed
by the presiding officer.

They were in fact not signed by either

the Board or the Administrative Law Judge. The Order adopting the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommended Order was signed by the
Division Director.
4.

The Director was present at the hearing.

However, the

limited record available for review does not indicate what, if any,
questions were put to Respondent, or any other witness, by the
Director. No evidence or transcripts were produced by Respondent,
or arguments made, which would enable a determination to be made as
to whether or not the Director acted as an advocate, or whether his
presence unduly influenced the process.
5.

Respondent does not indicate which portions of the Order

are not supported by the Findings of Fact.
6.

Respondent supplemented the request for review by listing

ten cases previously decided by the Division and Board against
other pharmacists, in which the penalties were less than those in
this case.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In Respondent's request for review, he cites no statutory
-3-
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or

other

authority

for

the

proposition

that

the Findings,

Conclusions and Recommended Order must be signed by the Board or
the Administrative Law Judge.

The procedure does not appear to

violate the Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), which, at §6346b-10, requires that in formal proceedings, the presiding officer
shall sign and issue the order. In this case, the order was signed
and issued by the division director, who was the
officer" for purposes of overseeing the proceedings.

"presiding
Pursuant to

§58-1-16(2), the director may designate a presiding officer in
disciplinary proceedings, which shall make written recommendations,
findings

of

fact and conclusions

of

law.

For purposes of

conducting a hearing and making recommendations, the director
designated the Board as the "presiding officer".
requirement that the recommendation be signed.

There is no
The procedure

followed herein, where the Division Director signed the final Order
adopting the Board's recommendations was not improper.
2.

Whether

the

Director's

presence

and

participation

constituted his an "advocate" is a contention which appears to be
without merit.

As noted above, Respondent produced no evidence,

transcripts or arguments which would assist in reviewing this
issue.

Without such a showing, the Director's participation, if

any, cannot be deemed to have been improper in any way, nor can it
be declared to have unduly influenced the Board's recommendations.
Common practice is for the Board to deliberate without the presence
of the Director; there was no evidence presented by Respondent as
to whether or not this in fact occurred -- nor that it would be
-4-
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improper even if it had.

If the Director were not present at the

hearing, or not asking questions, could Respondent have raised the
argument that he was thus not qualified to judge the case?
3.

Respondent next argues that the Order is not supported by

the findings of fact.

It is difficult to evaluate Respondent's

claim where he does not contest the findings, and provides no
specific statements of where the findings may be deficient.
undisputed

facts

can be

summarized

as

follows:

The

Respondent

dispensed dosages of a Schedule IV controlled substance, a Schedule
III controlled substance and a legend drug, either without a
physician's authorization, or dispensed them in unlabeled vials or
in a paper bag with no labels or instructions.

These findings

constitute a legally sufficient basis for the Order.

Section 58-

17-9 provides that the Division may suspend, revoke or restrict a
pharmacist's license for violating the law.
17-10(1)

specifically

makes

it

a

Further, Section 58-

violation

to

dispense

a

prescription drug without a prescription, or to fail to properly
label prescriptions.
4.

Finally,

Respondent

argues

that

the Order

revoking

Respondent's controlled substance license, and imposing a three
year probation on this pharmacist's

license, is too severe.

Respondent points out certain factors in Respondent's favor:
a.

Pharmacy is Respondent's lifetime profession;

b.

He was adjudged to have dispensed improperly only to

one long-time customer, who arguably had oral approval from a
physician for the refills;
-5-
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c.

The penalty is more severe than penalties in other

cases.
5.

Two separate penalties are at issue here. The first one,

revocation

of

Respondent's

controlled

substance

license,

is

mitigated somewhat by two factors. The Order allows Respondent to
employ another pharmacist, under Board supervision, to establish
controls with respect

to controlled

substances.

Second, an

examination of prior cases reveals that the Division and Board on
occasion entertain requests to reinstate licenses.

The second

penalty, a three-year probation of Respondent's pharmacist license,
was not

the most

harsh

that

the Order

could have imposed;

subsection 58-17-11 also allows the division to suspend or revoke
a license. With probation, Respondent can continue practicing as
a pharmacist, subject to Board supervision -- he simply cannot
personally dispense controlled substances.
6.

Of the other Division proceedings against pharmacists

cited by Respondent, such precedent is of limited value for several
reasons.

The cases cited are somewhat old: the most recent are

approximately three years old; other cases are as many as six years
old.

An examination of the cases cited by Respondent, as well as

others, yields ,more information not disclosed in the request for
review.

Note, for example, that the Leatherwood and Anderson

orders, cited by Respondent, were pursuant to stipulation of the
parties.

(Also, Respondent omits to mention that Leatherwood's

penalty actually was revocation, which was stayed in favor of
suspension and probation) . In the Nielson case, the license of the
-6-

pharmacy itself, a corporation, was placed on probation, which was
not the case in the order under review here.

In other cases not

cited by Respondent, severe sanctions were entered:
see

Morrison, No. 85-63

(license indefinitely

for example,
suspended by

stipulation); Jensen, No. 86-05 (default revocation of pharmacist
and controlled substance licenses); Evans, No. 88-20 (pharmacist
license suspended, controlled substance license surrendered, by
stipulation) . In addition, as pointed out by counsel for Division
in its Response to the request for review, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that a sanction is not invalid only because it is more
severe than sanctions in other cases.

Finally, where the Board,

the Administrative Law Judge and Director were present at the
hearing,

heard

the

testimony

and

were

able

to

observe

the

Respondent's demeanor, and found that restrictions were necessary
to protect the public health, safety and welfare, the sanction
should not be overturned or modified unless a compelling reason can
be demonstrated.
7.

In support of the penalty, the Order found that:
a.

attempting

"Respondent should have known
to

obtain

misrepresentation."
b.

drugs

by

[the patient] was
either

fraud

or

(Recommended Order, page 6)

"Respondent violated R153-17-12(2) when he prepared

documents to purportedly reflect a physician's authorization
for the medication which was dispensed when, in fact, no
authorization was made." (Page 6)
c.

Respondent engaged in "unprofessional conduct", was
-7-
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"grossly negligent" (page 6); his conduct was an "egregious
departure from those standards which govern his profession",
and he engaged in such misconduct on "numerous occasions"
(page 7 ) .
8.

Respondent's request on review that the Order be modified

so he can "continue as a licensed pharmacist" indicates an apparent
misunderstanding of the Order.

Under that order, Respondent can

continue: his license to practice as a pharmacist is placed on
probation

and

subject

to various

conditions, but he

is not

forbidden to practice.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
The order is upheld in its entirety.

Pursuant to Rule 151-

46b-12, the effective date of that order is ten days from the date
that this order on review is mailed.
Dated this

7^

day of July, 1992.

David L. Buhler, Executive Director
Department of Commerce

NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this Order may be sought by filing a
Petition for Review within thirty (30) days after the issuance of
this Order. Any Petition for such Review must comply with the
requirements set forth in Section 63-46b-14 and Section 63-46b-16.
-8-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the ^
day of July, 1992, I caused
to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order on
Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to:
Respondent:
Jack W. Pickett
Servus Drug Co,
55 North Main Street
Bountiful, UT 84010
Attorney for Respondent:
George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84010
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to:
David E. Robinson, Director
Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing
P.O Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Delia Welch, Assistant A.G.
Beneficial Life Tower
11th Floor
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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